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Abstract - RFID system (Radio-Frequency Identification) is a
technology for automated identification of objects and people.
Human beings are smart enough to identify an object under a
variety of challenge circumstances. RFID systems are
emerging as one of the most pervasive computing
technologies. But there are still a large number of problems
that are to be addressed. One of the fundamental issues still to
be addressed is privacy, which concludes association threat,
location threat, preference threat, constellation threat,
transaction threat, action threat and breadcrumb threat
(Kim, J., Yang, C, Jeon, J,2007). Misbehaviours of both
readers and tags will lead to attacks to the system. The
common attacks on the readers, tags and the air interface
between them comprise: Tracking or Tracing, Tamper,
Clandestine Scanning, Counterfeit Tags, Cloning Tags,
Eavesdropping, Replay, man-in-the-middle attack, Spoofing,
Differential power analysis, Timing Attacks, Denial of Service,
Physical Attacking and so on (P. Cuenca and L. Orozco-
Barbosa, 2006.),(Kim, J., Yang, C, Jeon, J, 2007). Due to
scarceness of resources most of the proposed protocols were
designed using symmetric key cryptographic algorithms.
However, it has been shown that it is inevitable to use public-
key cryptographic algorithms to satisfy these requirements.
A number of mechanisms have been devised   to overcome the
problems related to security and privacy issue of RFID
systems. In this paper we propose three anonymous RFID
authentication protocols and prove that they are secure in the
traditional cryptographic framework. Our model allows most
of the threats that apply to RFIDs systems including, denial of
service, impersonation, malicious traceability, information
leakage through power analysis and active man-in-the middle
attacks. Our protocols are efficient and scalable.
Keywords - RFID, Authentication, Privacy, Scalability,
Counterfeiting, Cloning.
I. INTRODUCTION
RFID (Radio-Frequency IDentification) is a technology
for automated identification of objects and people. Human
beings are skillful at identifying objects under a variety of
challenge circumstances. RFID may be viewed as a means
of explicitly labelling objects to facilitate their “perception”
by computing devices. An RFID device – frequently just
called an RFID tag – is a small microchip designed for
wireless data transmission. It is generally attached to an
antenna in a package that resembles an ordinary adhesive
sticker. The microchip itself can be as small as a grain of
sand, some 0.4mm2 [1]. An RFID tag transmits data over
the air in response to interrogation by an RFID reader.
Today, large organizations, such as Wal-Mart, Procter and
Gamble, and the United States Department of Defense are
deploying RFID as a tool for automated oversight of their
supply chains. Thanks to a combination of dropping tag
costs and vigorous RFID standardization, we are on the
brink of an explosion in RFID use.
RFID is supposed to be the successor of the optical
barcode printed on consumer products, with two individual
advantages:
i. Unique identification: A barcode indicates the
type of object on which it is printed, e.g., “This is
a 50 grams bar of XYZ brand 70% chocolate.” An
RFID tag goes a step ahead. It emits a unique
serial number that distinguishes among many
millions of identically manufactured objects; it
might indicate, e.g., that “This is 50 grams bar of
XYZ  brand 70% chocolate, serial no.
887891873.” The unique identifiers in RFID tags
can act as pointers to a database entries containing
rich transaction histories for individual items.
ii. Automation: Barcodes, being optically scanned,
require line-of-sight contact with readers, and thus
watchful physical positioning of scanned objects.
Except in the most rigorously controlled
environments, barcode scanning requires human
intervention. In contrast, RFID tags are readable
without line-of-sight contact and without precise
positioning. RFID readers can scan tags at rates of
hundreds per second. For example, an RFID
reader by a warehouse dock door can today scan
stacks of passing crates with high accuracy. In the
future, point-of-sale terminals may be able to
scan all of the items in passing shopping carts [2].
The main form of barcode-type RFID device is known
as an EPC (Electronic Product Code) tag. An organization
known as EPCglobal Inc. [3] oversees the development of
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the standards for these tags. Not surprisingly, EPCglobal is
a joint venture of the UCC and EAN, the bodies that
regulate barcode use in the United States and the rest of the
world respectively. EPC tags cost and  RFID readers cost
are dropping drastically [4].
In general, small and inexpensive RFID tags are passive.
They have no on-board power source; they derive their
transmission power from the signal of an interrogating
reader. Passive tags can operate in any of a number of
different frequency bands. LF (Low-Frequency) tags,
which operate in the 124 kHz – 135 kHz range, have
nominal read ranges of up to half a meter. HF (High-
Frequency) tags, operating at 13.56 MHz, have ranges up
to a meter or more (but typically on the order of tens of
centimetres). UHF tags (Ultra High-Frequency), which
operate at frequencies of 860 MHz – 960 MHz (and
sometimes 2.45GHz), have the longest range – up to tens of
meters. UHF tags, though, are subject to more ambient
interference than lower-frequency types. In this paper, we
enumerate the major standards for passive RFID devices.
Some RFID tags contain batteries. There are two such
types: semi-passive tags, whose batteries power their
circuitry when they are interrogated, and active tags, whose
batteries power their transmissions. Active tags can initiate
communication, and have read ranges of 100m or more.
Naturally, they are bit expensive.
II. RFID TODAY AND TOMORROW
Many of us already use RFID tags routinely. Examples
include:
 Proximity cards, that is, the contactless cards used
for building access.
 Automated toll-payment transponders – the small
plaques mounted in automobile windshields.
(These are usually semi-passive).
 The ignition keys of many millions of
automobiles, which include RFID tags as a theft-
deterrent.
 Payment tokens: In the United States, the
SpeedPassTM token for petrol station payments is
an example. Contact-less credit-cards, like
American Express ExpressPayTM and the
Mastercard PayPassTM use RFID.
Millions of house pets around the world have RFID tags
implanted in their bodies, to facilitate return to their owners
should they become lost.
In the world of the future – amazing things would be
possible. Here are a few possibilities that the reader might
dream up:
 Smart appliances: By exploiting RFID tags in
garments and packages of food, home appliances
could operate more cleverly. Washing machines
might select wash cycles automatically, for
instance, to avoid damage to delicate fabrics. Your
refrigerator might warn you when the milk has
expired or you have only one remaining carton of
yogurt – and could even transmit a shopping list
automatically to a home delivery service [5].
 Shopping: In retail shops, consumers could check
out by rolling shopping carts past point-of-sale
terminals. These terminals would automatically
tally the items, compute the total cost, and perhaps
even charge the consumers’ RFID-enabled
payment devices and transmit receipts to their
mobile phones. Consumers could return items
without receipts. RFID tags would act as indices
into database payment records, and help retailers
track the pedigrees of defective or contaminated
items.
 Interactive objects: Consumers could interact
with RFID-tagged objects through their mobile
phones. (Some mobile phones already have RFID
readers.) A consumer could scan a movie poster to
display show times on her phone. She could obtain
manufacturer information on a piece of furniture
she likes by waving her phone over it.
 Medication compliance: Research at Intel and the
University of Washington [6] exploits RFID to
facilitate medication compliance and home
navigation for the elderly and cognitively
impaired. As researchers have demonstrated, for
example, an RFID-enabled medicine cabinet could
help verify that medications are taken in a timely
fashion. More generally, RFID promises to bring
tremendous benefits to hospitals [7].
But what, really, is “RFID”?
We have discussed the basics of RFID and laid out
some evocative scenarios. Yet we have not formally
defined the term “RFID.” A wholly satisfying definition is
elusive. ut it is not a mere pedantic exercise: The definition
of RFID can have an important impact on technical and
policy discussion [8]. In this paper, we use “RFID” to
denote any RF device whose main function is identification
of an object or person. At the rudimentary end of the
functional spectrum, this definition excludes simple devices
like retail inventory tags, which merely indicate their
presence and on/off status. It also excludes portable devices
like mobile phones, which do more than merely identify
themselves or their bearers. A broad definition for “RFID”
is appropriate because the technical capabilities and
distinctions among RF devices will drift over time, and the
privacy and authentication concerns that we highlight in
this paper apply broadly to RF identification devices great
and small. Most importantly, though, the names of
standards like ‘ISO 14443” or ”EPC Class-1 Gen-2” do not
trip off the tongue or inhere well in the mind.
III. CONCEPTUALMODELS
An RFID authentication system has three components:
tags T, readers R, and a trusted server S. Tags are wireless
transponders: they typical have no power of their own and
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respond only when they are in an electromagnetic field.
Readers are transceivers and generate such field: they
challenge by broadcast any responding tag. There are two
types of broadcast challenges: multicast and unicast.
Multicast challenges are addressed to all tags in the range
of the reader, whereas unicast challenges are addressed to
specific tags. In our protocols below we have both types of
challenges. However, our multicast challenges are just
random strings, and all tags in the range of a reader R are
challenged with the same random string. This kind of
action is not usually counted as a communication pass.
We shall assume that all “honest” tags T adhere to the
system specifications and the requirements of the
authentication protocol. The same applies for the readers R
and of course the trusted server S - they are all “honest".
Tags are issued with private keys K which they share (only)
with the trusted server S. These keys are used by the tags
for identification. We denote by K the set of all authorised
keys (issued by S). Figure 1 illustrates the flow of
exchanged data between a tag T and the trusted server S via
the reader R, during the authentication of T.
T ↔ R  S
Figure 1: The authentication flow in an RFID system
We shall refer to the interaction between T and R as a
conversation and the data as an authentication transcript. In
our RFID authentication protocols we shall assume that R
and S are linked by a secure communication channel
(reliable and authenticated). Therefore, our protocols are
essentially two party protocols, one party being a tag T and
the other a reader R = RS, with secure access to a server S.
These parties are abstracted as probabilistic Turing
machines. T-machines with severely restrained resources,
and R-machines with adequate resources. For “optimistic"
authentication protocols, the resource must be minimized
for both machines.
This model describes the setting for the “honest" parties:
the tags that are authenticated with private keys  K  K ,
that adhere to the protocol, the readers R that adhere to the
protocol, and the trusted server.
IV.ATTACKS ON RFID
When designing secure RFID authentication protocols
one should also take into account attacks that are excluded
from the security model used (the system). Sometimes
these attacks may be prevented by using out-of-system
protection mechanisms. Of course, it is preferable to deal
with such attacks within the model. Below we list two such
attacks:
A. The Adversary
The adversary A can control a certain number of tags
and readers. The tags of the adversary, denoted by T´ are
unauthorised, in the sense they do not have a private key K
 K . Similarly, the readers of the adversary, denoted by
R´, are unauthorized, in the sense that they do not have
authenticated access to the trusted server S.
An active adversary A can modify the conversations
between any pair T, R arbitrarily (e.g. adaptively and
concurrently), and indeed initiate and terminate a session,
at its choice. As an extension of a passive (eavesdropping)
adversary, A is also allowed to learn the output of the
session, i.e. the reader’s decision to accept or not, at the end
of every sessions. Since the channel between a reader R
and the server S is assumed secure (authenticated), we do
not need allow A to interact with the server S directly, but
only through (honest) readers. When designing secure
RFID authentication protocols one should also take into
account attacks that are excluded from the security model
used (the system). Sometimes these attacks may be
prevented by using out-of-system protection mechanisms.
Of course, it is preferable to deal with such attacks within
the model.
B. Types of Attacks
When designing secure RFID authentication protocols
one should also take into account attacks that are excluded
from the security model used (the system). Sometimes
these attacks may be prevented by using out-of-system
protection mechanisms. Of course, it is preferable to deal
with such attacks within the model. Below we list such
attacks:
C. Side Channel Attacks (Power Analysis Attacks)
These are attacks in which the private key of a device is
extracted by exploiting either its power consumption when
inaccurate/accurate received bits are processed or the
variations in the timing of its energy output. This is the idea
of simple and differential power analysis was first
introduced by Kocher [9]. This is a serious threat. Thus
implementers need algorithms that are not only efficient
but also SCA registrant.
D. Online Man-in-the-Middle Relay Attacks
These are attacks in which an unauthorised reader R´
and tag T‘ interpose between an authentic tag T and reader
R so that, the authentication flow in (T, R, S) is diverted to
a flow (T, R´, T´ , R, TS) that authenticates the imposter
T‘ using the authentication data of T.
E. Online Man-in-the-Middle Active Attacks
These are attacks in which an unauthorized reader R´
and tag T´ interpose between an authentic tag T and reader
R so that, when R´ challenges T appropriately in (T, R´ ),
the data obtained will leak private information of T when
input to (T´R, S).
V. SECURITY IN RFID
The security of an RFID protocol can be described in
terms of three games, an authentication game Gauth, ananonymity game Ganon,  Ganon, a tracing game Gtrace and an
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availability game Gavail, with players: the adversary Aagainst the honest tags T and the honest readers R. In these
games there are two steps. The first step is a preparing step
for the adversary A: A is allowed to interact arbitrarily with
the tags and the readers. In the second step, A’s knowledge
is tested. The score of A in game G is his advantage adv A
G. A wins if his advantage is non-negligible. We now
describe in more detail the second steps of the four games:
Gauth, Gtrace, Ganon and Gavail.
A. Authentication
The authentications are done in two ways. By
authenticating a reader to a tag, a tag is to be ready to open
its information to a reader, and by authenticating a tag to a
reader, the system prohibits the usage of fake tags. We can
divide published authentication protocols into two types.
The first type is the fixed access control in which a tag
replies a reader with a fixed message. The second type is
the randomized access control in which a tag replies to a
reader with a pseudo-random message which varies each
time of the responses. The fixed access control is the
simplest type so that tags can be implemented in a cheap
price. However, this kind of protocols is under the tracking
problem [10], proposed a fixed access control using a hash
based access control, where tags reply with MetaIDs,
which are the hash outputs of their real IDs. Even though
attackers cannot figure out the real ID, the constant
responses of tags cause the tracking problem. A solution to
prevent the tracking problem is the randomized access
control. In order to randomize messages, a reader and a tag
need to share some secret information which is unknown to
attackers so that only the entities which have the secret
information can interpret the randomized messages. Again,
the randomized access control can be divided into two
types depending on whether all the readers and the tags
share the same secret information. Without sharing the
common secret information among all the readers and the
tags, making the response pseudo-random causes some
drawbacks. [10] described protocols which resolve tracking
problems, but the systems are not scalable since the server
needs to perform hashes for all the tags ID every time of
authentication protocols. One approach to resolve the un-
scalability of randomized access control is proposed in [11].
This scheme used a cryptanalytic method. However, this
method also causes some other problems. Since this
protocol uses time-memory trade-off method [11], in order
to reduce the searching time they have to increase the
amount of memory in the server. Another problem is that
the searching algorithm is probabilistic, i.e. there is some
probability to fail in searching for a tags ID. Even though
they are saying the failure probability is small, it can cause
a crucial problem in certain applications. Protocols
proposed in [12] [13] resolve the tracking problem by
sharing the common secret information among all the
readers and the tags. Even though these schemes are
scalable and resolve the tracking problem, they have a
crucial problem. By capturing and compromising only one
tag, attackers can reveal the secret information. Once the
secret information is revealed, the tags which share the
secret information will be under attack and attackers may
clone some other tags. Moreover, the protocol in [14] uses
a symmetric key encryption algorithm which is unsuitable
in low-cost RFID systems.
In the second step of Gauth, A must impersonate sometag T to some reader R. During this impersonation step, A
is allowed to interact arbitrarily with all other tags and
readers, except the one tag T that A is trying to impersonate.
The advantage of the adversary adv A Gauth is theprobability that A succeeds in authenticating itself to R. An
RFID protocol is a secure authentication protocol if adv A
Gauth is negligible. We have excluded A from interactingwith the tag T from the second step because this seems to
correspond to reality: if A were allowed to interact with T
as a reader R during this step, and then simply relay
faithfully the conversation between T and R‘ to an
authorised reader R in order to get authenticated as T
(without mounting any attack). This is the online man-in-
the middle attack described above in Untraceability is a
weak notion of anonymity. In the second step of the tracing
game Gtrace, A must trace some tag T: A is given access to(i.e. ability to interact with) a challenge tag T* and must
tell whether T*, is T or not, better than guessing. In this
tracing step, A is also allowed to interact with all tags and
readers, in particular, interacting with T. This is the
advantage adv A Gtrace of the adversary in this game.
B. Untraceability
Untraceability is a weak notion of anonymity. In the
second step of the tracing game Gtrace, A must trace sometag T: A is given access to (i.e. ability to interact with) a
challenge tag T* and must tell whether T*, is T or not,
better than guessing. In this tracing step, A is also allowed
to interact with all tags and readers, in particular,
interacting with T.
The advantage adv A Gauth of the adversary in this gameis |Prob[A correct] − ½ |,
where Prob[A correct] = Prob[A = yes|T = T‘] + Prob[A =
no|T ≠ T‘]  and we require that Prob[T = T‘] = ½.
We have untraceability if advA Gtrace is negligible.
C. Unlinkability
Unlinkability is a strong notion of anonymity, which is
the one we use in this paper. For anonymity we require that
the advantage  adv A Ganon of the adversary in the secondstep of Ganon in linking two different interactions to thesame tag is negligible. The setting for Ganon is the same asin Gtrace, except that in Gtrace the adversary already knows Tthrough other interactions in the first step. In Ganon both Tand T* are challenge tags. Through interacting with T and
T* ,as well as all other normal tags and readers, A must tell
International Journal of Science Engineering and Advance Technology,IJSEAT, Vol 1, Issue 5, October - 2013 ISSN 2321-6905
www.ijseat.com Page 107
whether it is interacting with identical tags or not, i.e.
whether T and  T* have the same key K  K or not.
D. Availability
In Gavail the adversary A must prevent a tag T frombeing authenticated by a reader R in a challenge session ses,
without interacting with this session ses. In this attack, A is
allowed to interact with all tags and all readers, except of
course for the session ses. The advantage adv A Ganon of Ain this game is the probability that R rejects T in the
challenge session ses. For completeness of an
authentication protocol P, we explicitly require that: for all
authorized tags T and readers R, P accepts with
overwhelming probability. We note that this is implied
implicitly in the availability game Gavail.
VI.RFIDMODELS TODEALWITH
COUNTERFEITING AND ATTACKS
In order to protect a product against cloning
(counterfeiting) a detection mark is embedded into the
product or its packaging. This detection mark consists of a
physical and a digital part. The mark is put there by a
legitimate authority. The attacker (counterfeiter) has access
to all components of this detection mark; i.e. she can read it,
remove it from the product and investigate it. Based on the
information that she obtained from investigating the legal
detection mark, she produces a fake detection mark. The
goal of the attacker is to produce a fake detection mark that
can only with small probability be distinguished from an
authentic one.
A. Components of Anti-Counterfeiting Technology
In order to protect a product against counterfeiting,
technological means are needed to verify whether the
product is authentic or not. In order to make an item
unclonable, the following two components are needed.
Physical protection. This is obtained by using
unclonable physical structures embedded in the package
(removal of the structure leads to its destruction). One or
more unique fingerprints derived from the physical
structure will be printed on the product for the verification
of the authenticity of the product.
Cryptographic protection is serving two goals. Firstly,
cryptography provides techniques (digital signatures) to
detect and prevent tampering with data (fingerprints)
derived from a physical object. Secondly, it provides secure
identification protocols to identify a product. Those
protocols do not leak any necessary identification
information to an eavesdropper attacking (actively or
passively) the communication channel.
Good candidates for uncolnable physical structures that
can be used for physical protection purposes, are so-called
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [15].
B. General Anti-Counterfeiting Protocol
We give intuition for protocols that can be used to
check the authenticity of a product based on embedding a
PUF in the product in combination with the use of
cryptographic techniques.
First there is an enrollment phase, which is performed
by some trusted authority. During this phase the following
steps are performed.
i. Several fingerprints are derived from the PUF by
challenging it with multiple challenges and
recording the responses. These responses are then
turned into binary fingerprints (and some auxiliary
data are derived for use during the verification
phase).
ii. These challenges, fingerprints and auxiliary data
are then signed with the secret key sk of the issuer
of the product (the issuer is assumed to be
trustworthy).
iii. The signatures, the challenges (corresponding to
the fingerprints) and may be some auxiliary data
(needed to perform processing during the
authentication phase) are also printed on the
product (and/or stored in a database).
During the verification phase, the authenticity is
checked by running the following protocol.
i. The verification device reads the challenges and
auxiliary data.
ii. The verification device challenges the physical
structure with one of the challenges printed on the
product. After having measured the responses, it
derives the fingerprint from the response based on
the auxiliary data.
iii. Then, using the fingerprint derived in step 2, the
verification device checks the signature to verify
that the fingerprint, challenges and auxiliary data
were printed on the product by a legitimate
authority. If the signature is not correct, the
product is not authentic.
We briefly analyze the security of this protocol. An
attacker who wants to counterfeit the product has to embed
a fake physical structure on the product that produces
correct fingerprints to the challenges (with correct
signatures). Under the assumption that the physical
structure is unclonable, she cannot produce a clone of the
originally embedded physical structure. More precisely, we
assume that given some challenges c1 …., cn andcorresponding fingerprints s1….,sn she cannot produce a
International Journal of Science Engineering and Advance Technology,IJSEAT, Vol 1, Issue 5, October - 2013 ISSN 2321-6905
www.ijseat.com Page 108
(fake) physical structure that produces the same
fingerprints s1…., sn given the original challenges c1…., cn.On the other hand she can produce another structure and
create challenges, auxiliary data and fingerprints s´1…., s´n
according to the procedures used during enrollment.
However, since she does not know the secret key sk and the
responses of her fake structure will be different with very
high probability, she will not be able to put the correct
signatures on these data. The verification device will detect
that the signatures are not correct and reject this as a fake
product. We note that the number of fingerprints that can
be verified during a verification session is very limited by
time and space constraints. Furthermore, the attacker can
easily capture the required fingerprints (by measuring the
responses according to the challenges printed on the
product). Therefore the production of a clone only requires
the fabrication of a physical structure (PUF) producing the
same fingerprints for a limited number of challenges.
The PUF based solution for preventing counterfeiting
of goods that was presented above can be improved with
active components, that are inseparably linked with a PUF.
An example consists of an RFID-tag equipped with a
microchip that is inseparably bound to a PUF. Because of
the presence of a microchip a secure identification protocol
can be run without revealing any information on the
fingerprint of the PUF. Additionally, by inseparably linking
the chip and the PUF, it becomes possible to prevent
leakage of the PUF measurement to the outside world.
Typical RFID systems consist of the following two
components: the RFID-tag and a reader. The reader will
perform the verification to detect whether a tag is authentic
or not. The RFID-tag consists of an antenna connected to a
microchip that can store and read data and has possibly
some dedicated hardware to perform a small amount of
computations. Typically, the power for performing
operations is obtained from the RF-field (by inductive
coupling). A reader can read and write data from/on a tag.
The reader is often linked with some system that can
perform computations on the data that it receives from tags.
In order to use RFID-tags for anti-counterfeiting
purposes, we proceed as follows. An RFID-tag containing
reference information is embedded in a product. The
(identification) data stored in the memory of the tag is
signed with the secret key sk of the legitimate issuer. The
tag communicates with a reader for verification purposes
over a public channel. The ROM memory of the tag is
accessible to the attacker. The reader has a certified public
key pk corresponding the issuer's secret key for verification
of the digital signatures.
C. Power Analysis Attacks
Our RFID authentication protocols in the next section
are designed to deal with power analysis attacks and offline
man-in-the middle active attacks. For the online man-in-the
middle attacks an \out-of-system" solution should be sought.
In this section we propose three RFID authentication
protocols, a 2-pass authentication protocol and two 1-pass
authentication protocols. The last protocol is optimistic, in
the sense that its cost is low when the adversary is passive.
We shall prove that these are secure using our security
model, and that the tags are untraceable. These protocols
address most of the drawbacks of the authentication
protocols in [16, 17, 19, 18, 20], and will also thwart power
analysis attacks. Our first protocol is an extension of YA-
TRAP proposed by G. Tsudik [19] which we briefly
describe below.
i. YA-TRAP [Yet Another Trivial Authentication
Protocol]
For this protocol, the timeline is divided into small
periods, during which each tag is allowed to be
authenticated at most once. The readers and the
server maintain a (loosely) synchronized
timestamp tsys. The tags do not have clocks. Eachtag T is equipped with a pseudo-random number
generator (which may be resolved as an iterated
keyed hash function), and is initialized with a
private key K and timestamps t0 and tmax, K is the
set of all keys that have been issued to tags.
When a reader R activates tag T, it broadcasts the
current timestamp tsys. If tsys <= ttag, where ttag wasthe last timestamp that T received, or if tsys > tmax,then T broadcasts a pseudorandom string;
otherwise T broadcasts h = HK(tsys), and sets ttag =tsys. Here HK(tsys) is the hash of tsys with key K, andttag is initialized with the value t0.
The server S finds the value of the key that T has
used in h from a hash look-up table - see Figure 2.
In this table, whenever a timestamp ts is updated,the server computes the keyd hash values HK(ts)
for all keys K  K, and get the next row of the
table. This table, {h i,j = HKi (j)}, makes it possiblefor the server S to find out whether the tag T that
issued the hash h is authentic, h = htsys;j for some j [1, n], without having to search exhaustively
for the key each time a new tag is challenged
during time period ts (typically one or a fewminutes).
Figure 2: The hash look-up table.
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Tsudik points out [19] that there is a drawback in
YA-TRAP: the adversary can send a wildly
inaccurate timestamp t´sys (say the maximumtimestamp allowed) and incapacitate the tag. This
is a DoS attack which will kill the tag. It quite is
difficult to address this attack since the tag T
needs to update its time ttag regardless of the valueof the time t´sys sent by adversary, otherwise itsidentity will be traced by sending the same t´sysevery time. To avoid tracing, it is not sufficient to
randomize the tag's response since that would
eliminate the savings that the server gets from
using the look-up table.
There is also a “future-time” attack in which the
adversary queries the tag offline with several valid
time periods t sys; i, i = 1, 2 , , , . .. The adversarythen captures the tag's responses and can use that
for online authentication when these time periods.
Therefore, by using a predictable time value as a
challenge for the tag will not work. In the
following section we show who to deal with these
attacks while keeping the server scalable by
adapting the protocol YA-TRAP.
ii. A 2-Pass Optimistic Anonymous RFID
Authentication Protocol
YA-TRAP is (essentially) a 1-pass protocol, in the
sense that the timestamp is broadcast (not unicast)
by R to all tags in range. We now show that how
to extend YA-TRAP to deal with the DoS attack
in which the adversary disables the tag T by
sending an inaccurate timestamp.
The protocol we propose is essentially a 1-pass
authentication protocol with an optional pass. In
the first step the tag is authenticated, whereas in
the second step the server authenticates the
timestamp. The protocol is given in Figure 3.
Figure 3: A 2-Pass optimistic anonymous RFID authentication
protocol
In our protocol the tag T, instead of sending a
pseudo-random string when the timestamp it gets
is out of its bounds, it sends a keyd hash of the
string (1, Ttag , tsys). This will save the tag T, butnow the server S must work harder. More
specifically, if the hash value h is not in the look-
up table (see Figure 2), then the server must search
exhaustively for the key K. Of course, this only
happens with tags that the adversary has tried to
kill (or incapacitate).
Our approach is to shift the adversary's attack
from the low complexity tags to the server. This
approach is optimistic, in the sense that when the
adversary is passive than the server need only use
the look-up table. Note that pass 2 is optional.
This pass is only used by the server during time
periods when a number of attacks occur beyond a
certain threshold and the server would like to
resynchronize the time tsys to all the tags so thattheir stored time ttag is valid.
This is applied to all tags during such time periods
so that no identity information are revealed. When
this period passes, the server could return to
normal operation and will bypass pass 2. This
makes the scheme resistant to DoS while being
almost as efficient as [19].
iii. A 1-Pass Optimistic Anonymous RFID
Authentication protocol
Figure 4: A look-up string table.
This protocol uses a key lookup table in which the
keys K are linked to session number TK, seeFigure 4. The optimistic protocol is described in
Figure 5 and is only one pass.
Figure 5: A 1-Pass anonymous RFID authentication protocol
The protocol described in Figure 5 always uses
only one pass. When a tag has been attacked, its
pseudo random value Ttag will be out-of-sync withits counterpart sK stored in the server. At this time,the server will have to search for all keys to find
the correct one and then resynchronize sK. Even
International Journal of Science Engineering and Advance Technology,IJSEAT, Vol 1, Issue 5, October - 2013 ISSN 2321-6905
www.ijseat.com Page 110
when this happens, the scheme has the advantage
that the server only needs to do extra computation
for tags that are authenticated, not for all the tags.
When no fault occurs, the server simply has to do
one lookup and hashing for each authenticating
tag. So computation is saved on tags that do not
communicate.
In the non-optimistic version of this protocol, the
tag and server uses true random Ttag and thereforethe server needs to search and udpate its value for
any tag that requires authentication. This scheme
is suitable for cases where the number of active
tags is smaller than the number of tags.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is astonishing how a modest device like an RFID tag,
essentially just a wireless license plate, can give rise to the
complex melange of security and privacy problems that we
explore here. RFID privacy and security are stimulating
research areas that involve rich interplay among many
disciplines, like signal processing, hardware design,
supply-chain logistics, privacy rights and cryptography.
An important aspect of RFID security is that of user
perception of security and privacy in RFID systems. As
users cannot see RF emissions, they form their impressions
based on physical cues and industry explanations. RFID
will come to secure ever more varied forms of physical
access and logical access. To engineer usable RFID
systems and permit informed policy decisions, it is
important to understand how RFID and people mix.
Both the physical cloning attack as well as the cloning
attack based on (actively or passively) attacking the
protocol between the tag and the reader can be prevented. It
has been shown that the required protocols are feasible on
an RFID-tag in the offline situation.
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